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Abstract
We provide several tests to determine whether a game is a potential game or whether it
is a zero-sum equivalent game—a game which is strategically equivalent to a zero-sum game
in the same way that a potential game is strategically equivalent to a common interest game.
We present a unified framework applicable for both potential and zero-sum equivalent games
by deriving a simple but useful characterization of these games. This allows us to re-derive
known criteria for potential games, as well as obtain several new criteria. In particular, we
prove (1) new integral tests for potential games and for zero-sum equivalent games, (2) a new
derivative test for zero-sum equivalent games, and (3) a new representation characterization
for zero-sum equivalent games.
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1. Introduction
We provide several tests to determine whether a game is a potential game or whether it is
a zero-sum equivalent game—a game which is strategically equivalent to a zero-sum game in
the same way that a potential game is strategically equivalent to a common interest game (see
Definition 1 and also Section 11.2 in Hofbauer and Sigmund (1998)). We present a unified
framework applicable for both potential and zero-sum equivalent games by deriving a simple
but useful characterization of these games. This allows us to re-derive known criteria for
potential games, such as Monderer and Shapley (1996), Ui (2000) and Sandholm (2010), as
well as obtain several new criteria. In particular, we prove (1) new integral tests for potential
games and for zero-sum equivalent games, (2) a new derivative test for zero-sum equivalent
games, and (3) a new representation characterization for zero-sum equivalent games.
An advantage of our approach is that our new integral tests can be applied to normal form
games with continuous strategy sets as well as those with finite strategy spaces, whether payoff
functions are discontinuous or not. Many popular games with continuous strategy sets, such
as Bertrand competition games and Hotelling games, have discontinuous payoff functions. It
is well-known that games with continuous strategy sets and discontinuous payoff pose special
challenges such as the existence of Nash equilibria (see, for example, Reny (1999)). Our
integral test provides a useful tool to study this class of games. In the case of finite strategy
sets our test reduces to the test in Sandholm (2010).
The integral test for potential games is also easier to implement than the cycle condition
in Monderer and Shapley (1996)’s Theorem 2.8 (Remark 1). For, say, a two-player game
our integral test requires checking the values of a function at two different points, while the
cycle condition requires checking the values of a function at four different points. For finite
strategy sets, Hino (2011) and Sandholm (2010)’s algorithms checking for potential games
have complexity O(n2) and the integral test has the same complexity.
We also study in detail zero-sum equivalent games and provide integral and derivative
tests as well as representations of those games. While the derivative test for potential games
is well-known (Monderer and Shapley (1996) Theorem 4.5), the derivative test for zero-sum
equivalent games is new and provides an easy and convenient way to check if a game is
zero-sum equivalent when the payoff function is sufficiently smooth (Proposition 3). The
usefulness of this test is illustrated in Example 2 where we analyze contest games. Finally,
we provide a representation characterization (Proposition 4) which generalizes to zero-sum
equivalent games the result in Ui (2000).
In the existing literature, conditions for potential games, such as Monderer and Shapley
(1996), Ui (2000) and Sandholm (2010), are regarded as distinct and derived by different
methods (see, e.g., the discussion in Section 3 in Sandholm (2010)). Our result provides a
unified framework to understand and generalize (also to zero-sum equivalent games) these
conditions.
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2. Examples
We illustrate our results with two simple examples. First we discuss the integral test for
potential games.
Example 1. (Integral test for potential games) Consider a two-player game where the
strategy sets are two intervals S1 and S2 with Lebesgue measures |S1| and |S2|, respectively,
and the payoffs are u(1)(s1, s2) and u
(2)(s1, s2). By definition the game is a potential game
if the payoff has the form u(1)(s1, s2) = v(s1, s2) + g(s2) and u
(2)(s1, s2) = v(s1, s2) + h(s1).
Then it is easy to check that we have the equality
u(1)(s1, s2)−
1
|S1|
∫
u(1)(s1, s2)ds1 −
1
|S2|
∫
u(1)(s1, s2)ds2 +
1
|S1||S2|
∫
u(1)(s1, s2)ds1ds2
=u(2)(s1, s2)−
1
|S1|
∫
u(2)(s1, s2)ds1 −
1
|S2|
∫
u(2)(s1, s2)ds2 +
1
|S1||S2|
∫
u(2)(s1, s2)ds1ds2 .
(1)
Our integral test asserts that if equation (1) holds, the game is actually a potential game.
By the symmetry of the formula in s1 and s2, one also sees that if the payoffs have the form
u(1)(s1, s2) := v(s1, s2)+g(s1) and u
(2)(s1, s2) := v(s1, s2)+h(s2), then the condition (1) holds
and thus the game is a potential game. This provides another characterization of potential
games (see Proposition 4). Although somewhat trivial, this example illustrates our integral
test in the simplest possible setting.
Next we use our derivative test for a class of contest games.
Example 2. (Contest games) Suppose that S1 = S2 = (0,∞) and consider the following
contest game (see, e.g., Konrad (2009)). For f positive, define
u(1)(s1, s2) =
f(s1)
f(s1) + f(s2)
v − c1(s1), u
(2)(s1, s2) =
f(s2)
f(s1) + f(s2)
v − c2(s2) . (2)
We set p(1)(s1, s2) := f(s1)/(f(s1) + f(s2)) and p
(2)(s1, s2) := 1 − p
(1)(s1, s2) which are the
probabilities of winning a prize of value v. Here, si is the amount of resources invested in
the contest to obtain the prize while ci(si) is its associated cost.
Our derivative test for zero-sum equivalent games (see Proposition 3) asserts that when
the payoffs are differentiable, a game is equivalent to a zero-sum game if we have the equality
∂2u(1)
∂s1∂s2
(s1, s2) +
∂2u(2)
∂s1∂s2
(s1, s2) = 0 .
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Indeed we have
∂2u(1)
∂s1∂s2
+
∂2u(2)
∂s1∂s2
= v
∂2p(1)
∂s1∂s2
+ v
∂2p(2)
∂s1∂s2
= 0
from p(1)(s1, s2) + p
(2)(s1, s2) = 1. If f(si) = si
α where α ≤ 1 and ci(si) = si, the game in (2)
admits a pure strategy Nash equilibrium (Konrad, 2009).
3. Main Results
We follow the setup in Hwang and Rey-Bellet (2014) where we provide general decom-
position theorems for n−player games. Let S = S1 × · · · × Sn be the space of all strategy
profiles where Si is the set of strategies for the i
th player. Let mi be a finite measure on Si
and m be the product measure m := m1 × · · · ×mn. We denote by u
(i) the payoff function
for the ith player, where u(i) : S → R is a (measurable) function. For fixed n and S, a game
is uniquely specified by the vector-valued function u := (u(1), u(2), · · · , u(n)).
We use the notation g(s−i) for a function which does not depend on its i-th argument. If
the payoff for the ith player has the form u(i)(s) = g(i)(s−i) then her payoff does not depend
on her own strategy (also called a passive game). It is easy to see that if two game payoffs
differ by a passive game for each player, then they have the same Nash equilibria and best
response functions—these are called strategically equivalent.
Definition 1. We have:
(i) A game u is a potential game if there exists a function v and functions g(i)’s such that
(u(1)(s), u(2)(s), · · · , u(n)(s)) = (v(s), v(s), · · · , v(s)) + (g(1)(s−1), g
(2)(s−2), · · · , g
(n)(s−n)) .
(ii) A game u is a zero-sum equivalent game if there exists functions v(i)’s with
∑
i v
(i) =
0 and functions g(i)’s such that
(u(1)(s), u(2)(s), · · · , u(n)(s)) = (v(1)(s), v(2)(s), · · · , v(n)(s))+(g(1)(s−1), g
(2)(s−2), · · · , g
(n)(s−n)) .
The definition of a potential game in Monderer and Shapley (1996) is that u is a potential
game if there exists a function v such that u(i)(si, s−i)− u
(i)(s˜i, s−i) = v(si, s−i) − v(s˜i, s−i)
for all si, s˜i, s−i and all i. This is easily shown to be equivalent to Definition 1.
The next proposition is simple but important since it recasts the definitions of potential
and zero-sum equivalent games without reference to unknown functions v or v(i) in Definition
1. This will provide the key ingredient to establish our criteria.
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Proposition 3
Derivative Tests
Proposition 2
Integral Tests
Remark 1
Cycle Conditions
Proposition 4
Representations
Figure 1: Relationships between various conditions. This figure shows the relationships between
various conditions. All our conditions are derived from Proposition 1. We first derive the integral tests
from Proposition 1 (Proposition 2). We then derive the derivative tests (Proposition 3) and derive the
representation characterizations (Proposition 4). A cycle condition for zero-sum equivalent games appears in
Hwang and Rey-Bellet (2014).
Proposition 1 (Characterization). We have:
(i) A game u is a potential game if and only if there exist functions g(i)’s such that for all
i, j
u(i)(s)− g(i)(s−i) = u
(j)(s)− g(j)(s−j) . (3)
(ii) A game u is a zero-sum equivalent game if and only if there exist functions g(i)’s such
that
n∑
i=1
[
u(i)(s)− g(i)(s−i)
]
= 0 . (4)
Proof. The “only if” parts are trivial. Conversely, let us assume that there exist g(i)’s which
satisfy the conditions (3) or (4). Then, if we write
(u(1)(s), u(2)(s), · · · , u(n)(s)) = (u(1)(s)− g(1)(s−1), u
(2)(s)− g(2)(s−2), · · · , u
(n)(s)− g(n)(s−n))
+ (g(1)(s−1), g
(2)(s−2), · · · , g
(n)(s−n))
we see that u is a potential game if (3) holds and that u is a zero-sum equivalent game if (4)
holds.
For our integral test, we introduce some operators.
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Definition 2. For an integrable function h:S → R, we define Ti, Tˆi by
Tih(s) := h(s)−
1
mi(Si)
∫
h(s)dmi(si) and Tˆi = I − Ti,
where I is the identity operator.
Note that Ti and Tj commute and that we have the identity
TiTj = I − (Tˆi + (I − Tˆ i)Tˆ j) , (5)
and, by induction,
n∏
l=1
Tl = I − (Tˆ1 +
n∑
j=2
j−1∏
l=1
(1− Tˆl)Tˆ j) . (6)
Note as well for a function g(s−i) we have Tig = 0 and for any h, Tˆih does not depend on si.
We next prove our integral tests.
Proposition 2 (Integral Tests). We have:
(i) A game u is a potential game if and only if for all i, j
TiTju
(i) − TiTju
(j) = 0 . (7)
(ii) A game u is a zero-sum equivalent game if and only if
n∑
i=1
n∏
l=1
Tlu
(i) = 0 . (8)
Proof. Suppose that a game is a potential game (or a zero-sum equivalent game). Equation
(7) (or (8)) follows from equation (3) (or equation (4)) in Proposition 1. Conversely, for (i)
from (5) we find that
TiTj(u
(i) − u(j)) = 0 if and only if u(i) − u(j) = Tˆi(u
(i) − u(j)) + (1− Tˆi)Tˆj(u
(i) − u(j)).
Observe that Tˆi(u
(i)−u(j)) does not depend on si and (1− Tˆi)Tˆj(u
(i)−u(j)) does not depend
on sj . Thus from Proposition 1, u is a potential game. For (ii), from (6) we obtain
n∑
i=1
n∏
l=1
Tlu
(i) =
n∏
l=1
Tl
n∑
i=1
u(i) = 0 if and only if
n∑
i=1
u(i) = Tˆ1
n∑
i=1
u(i)+
n∑
j=2
j−1∏
l=1
(1−Tˆl)Tˆ j
n∑
i=1
u(i).
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Again, observe that Tˆ1
∑n
i=1 u
(i) does not depend on s1 and
∏j−1
l=1 (1 − Tˆl)Tˆ j
∑n
i=1 u
(i) does
not depend on sj . Thus from Proposition 1, u is a zero-sum equivalent game.
Remark 1. (The cycle condition) The integral test can be compared to the well-known
cycle condition of Monderer and Shapley (1996) (Theorem 2.8) which asserts that a game is
a potential game if and only if for all i and j and si, sj, s˜i, s˜j, we have[
u(i)(s˜i, sj, s−i,j)− u
(i)(si, sj, s−i,j)
]
+
[
u(j)(s˜i, s˜j, s−i,j)− u
(j)(s˜i, sj , s−i,j)
]
+
[
u(i)(si, s˜j, s−i,j)− u
(i)(s˜i, s˜j, s−i,j)
]
+
[
u(j)(si, sj, s−i,j)− u
(j)(si, s˜j , s−i,j)
]
= 0. (9)
For an example of two-player games, the cycle condition requires checking the values of a
function of four variables, while the integral test for potential games requires checking the
values of a function of two variables—this implies a significant reduction of the computational
complexity. For instance, if we numerically compare two functions at n different points, the
number of equalities to be checked under our test is order n2, while this number under the
cycle condition test becomes order n4 (see the related discussion on p.200 in Hino (2011)).
Note as well that in Hwang and Rey-Bellet (2014) we prove a cycle-like condition for games
which are zero-sum equivalent.
If S is a finite set and m is the counting measure, then the integral test for potential
games becomes the condition by Sandholm (2010). For the convenience of the reader, we
provide a two-player version.
Corollary 1 (Sandholm 2010). A two player game with payoff matrices (A,B) is a potential
game if and only if
Aij−
1
|S1|
∑
i
Aij−
1
|S2|
∑
j
Aij+
1
|S1|
1
|S2|
∑
i,j
Aij = Bij−
1
|S1|
∑
i
Bij−
1
|S2|
∑
j
Bij+
1
|S1|
1
|S2|
∑
i,j
Bij .
For the derivative test one needs to assume that strategy sets Si consist of intervals and
that payoff functions u(i) are twice continuously differentiable on S. An elementary fact from
calculus is that if function g is twice continuously differentiable, then
∂2g
∂si∂sj
(s) = 0 if and only if g(s) = G(s−i) +K(s−j)
for some G and K. From this, it is easy to derive a derivative test for potential games
(Monderer and Shapley (1996), Theorem 4.5). We also provide a similar test for zero-sum
equivalent games.
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Proposition 3 (Derivative Tests). Assume that the strategy sets are intervals. Then we
have:
(i)(Monderer and Shapley 1996) If u is twice-continuously differentiable, the game u is a
potential game if and only if for all i, j
∂2u(i)
∂si∂sj
(s) =
∂2u(j)
∂si∂sj
(s). (10)
(ii) If u is n-times continuously differentiable, the game u is zero-sum equivalent if and only
if
n∑
i=1
∂nu(i)
∂s1∂s2 · · ·∂sn
(s) = 0. (11)
Proof. Again, from Proposition 1 “only parts” easily follow. For “if” parts, (i) follows from
the remark before Proposition 3. For (ii), we observe that
∂n
∑n
i=1 u
(i)
∂s1∂s2 · · ·∂sn
(s) = 0 if and only if
n∑
i=1
u(i)(s) = g(1)(s−1) + g
(2)(s−2) + · · ·+ g
(n)(s−n).
Finally, our last results are alternative representations which are useful to identify games.
Proposition 4 (Representation). We have:
(i) (Ui 2000) A game u is a potential game if and only if there exist functions w and g(i)’s
such that
u(i)(s) = w(s) +
∑
l 6=i
g(l)(s−l). (12)
(ii) A game u is a zero-sum equivalent game if and only if there exist a constant c, functions
w(i)’s and g(i)’s such that
∑
i w
(i)(s) = c and
u(i)(s) = w(i)(s) +
∑
l 6=i
g(l)(s−l) .
Proof. We again use Proposition 1. Observe that for the “if” part in (i)
u(i)(s)− u(j)(s) =
∑
l 6=i
g(l)(s−l)−
∑
l 6=j
g(l)(s−l) = g
(j)(s−j)− g
(i)(s−i) ,
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and for the “if” part in (ii)
n∑
i=1
u(i)(s) = c+
n∑
i=1
∑
l 6=i
g(l)(s−l) = c+
n∑
l=1
∑
i 6=l
g(l)(s−l) =
n∑
l=1
(
c
n
+ (n− 1)g(l)(s−l)),
so the assertions follow from Proposition 1. Conversely, let u be a potential game. Then
u(i)(s) = u(i)(s)− g(i)(s−i) + g
(i)(s−i) +
∑
l 6=i
g(l)(s−l)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:w(s)
−
∑
l 6=i
g(l)(s−l).
Similarly, if u is a zero-sum equivalent, then we write
u(i)(s) = u(i)(s)− g(i)(s−i) + g
(i)(s−i)−
1
n− 1
∑
l 6=i
g(l)(s−l)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:w(i)(s)
+
1
n− 1
∑
l 6=i
g(l)(s−l).
Observe that
∑n
i=1
1
n−1
∑
l 6=i g
(l)(s−l) =
∑n
l=1 g
(l)(s−l). From these “only if” parts follow.
The first part of Proposition 4 is closely related to Theorem 3 in Ui (2000). It is identical
for two-player games and easily seen to be equivalent in general. Proposition 4 provides a
useful tool to verify if a game is a potential game or a zero-sum equivalent. For example, if
u(i)(s) = w(i)(s) + h(i)(si), as is often the case in economics models with quasi-linear utility
functions where benefit and cost functions are separable, one ignores the cost term depending
on his own strategy to determine if the game is potential or zero-sum equivalent.
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